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Why should something so
funda,nental as the environment go
unrecognized in something so
fundan1ental as the Constitution?

The Environment,
the Constitution,
and the Coupling
Fallacy
James E. Krier
This article is based on a paper entitled "Environmental
Quality as a Political Question" that was delivered at
the University of Tennessee's October 1987 Bicentennial
Conference on The Constitution and the Environment.
Shortly after the environmental movement first got
underway, alp:1.ost 20 years ago now, there appeared a
little parade of articles urging a constitutional right to
a clean environment. While a few of the articles campaigned for an amendment to this effect, most of them
reasoned that an amendment was unnecessary. They
argued that the right in question is already in the Constitution, however inconspicuously - in the Ninth
Amendment, say, or in the concept of ordered liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause, or in the so-called
penumbra of the Bills of Rights. They asked the courts
simply to acknowledge this reading, but the courts did
not. The United States Supreme Court has not subscribed to any of the theories advanced by the articles,
and neither have the lower federal courts nor the state
courts, with a couple of inconsequential exceptions.
Why should something so fundamental as the
environment go unrecognized in something so fundamental as the Constitution? True, there is no explicit
statement of an environmental right in the constitutional text, but it hardly follows that such a right could
not be read in, and in a principled way. The reading
would be principled because it would reason from precedents themselves principled, and because it would
follow one or another broadly accepted method of constitutional interpretation. Neither of these points needs
to be belabored. There are precedents, involving precisely the theories mentioned above, with which to
build plausible arguments for a constitutional right to
environmental quality. And conventional canons of con-

stitutional interpretation permit one to read between
the lines. There is rio explicit right to privacy in the
Constitution, for example, but there is a constitutional
right of privacy. And the Constitution does not explicitly provide a right to defense counsel, at government
expense, in criminal prosecutions, but there is a constitutional right to this effect. So too for the exclusionary
rule and the right to travel and so on. The Constitution
is longer, and larger, than its text. So why no constitutional right to environmental quality?
Two reasons are usually given, but I think they boil
down to one. The literature mentioned above, arguing
for the constitutional right, was regarded by critics as
high-minded but also high-flown. Close examination
of the literature's claims suggested that their connection
to accepted constitutional understanding was too
attenuated. My colleague Philip Soper reached just this
conclusion after a very patient and, I think, sympathetic
review of the entire subject published in 1974. Richard
Stewart, writing three years later, was more dismissive.
'Advocacy of a constitutional right to environmental
quality," he said, "has been rejected by the courts.
There is little doubt that the judges are correct in resisting these siren calls. The asserted right lacks any
foundations in the constitutional text or in history."
Call this the doctrinal reason against the right.

Critics of a constitutional
environmental right insist that such
a right would reach well beyond the
range of judicial competence . . .
Constitutional doctrine is not, of course, formed in
a vacuum; to some degree, the Constitution and decisions interpreting it are read to say what they should
say, to mean what it makes sense to have them mean,
from the perspective of a given reader. To some degree,
then, the readings of Soper and Stewart and others like
them clearly are influenced by the belief that it would
not be sensible to read the environment into constitu-
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and there is little if any principled basis for any of this
so how would the courts manage? And even if they
managed, they would still be left with the embarrassing problem of figuring out how to implement the
constitutionally required programs. Courts lack the
competence, technical and political, for all of these
tasks.
Soper is less transparent than Stewart, but his brief
discussion of "judicial competence" did mention more
or less the same points that Stewart repeated later.
And Soper was very explicit in stating the bottom line.
The functional considerations, he said, pointed to the
concl':1sion that envir~nmental matters are "more appropriately left to the Judgment of the legislature" and
to "majoritarian determination."
In other words, to politics.

tional law. There might be any number of reasons
for this belief, but one has been obviously dominant.
Critics of a constitutional environmental right insist
~ha~ ~uch a right would reach well beyond the range of
Judiaal competence, in both the immediate sense of
technical capacity and the more remote sense of political legitimacy. This is the functional reason against the
right, and, I think, the rationale that drives the doctrinal reading of people like Stewart and Soper.
Professor Stewart is the most transparent in this regard . After writing the language I quoted above, he
went on to discuss at much greater length all of the
functional reasons why he considered the doctrinal case
for the constitutional right to be weak. He had to do
this, because he conceded that the argument from doctrine was "not necessarily a decisive objection .. . ."
So he went on to say, in several passages too lengthy to
quote, that (doctrine aside) "there are other basic difficulties ." If the constitutional right were recognized,
courts would be ultimately responsible for large resource allocation decisions, and this could mean that
they would have to use economic and other methods of
technical analysis when there is no reason to suppose
that they know how; and they would have to determine
the distributional impacts of various environmental policy alternatives, a determination that is itself a difficult
technical matter, and then trade these impacts off
against allocational efficiency without the assistance of
any accepted guide for making such tradeoffs; and they
would have to confront the polycentric and dynamic
characteristics of environmental policy and figure the
impact of alternatives on research and development in
the field of pollution control technology, not to mention
(Stewart didn't) the impacts of one environmental policy - dealing with air quality, say - on other
environmental media, such as water and land; and they
would have to puzzle over questions having to do with
values and preferences and intergenerational justice;
36

Exactly! Ignore for now the possibility that the likes
of Soper would insist that doctrine really is the central
concern, because there will be occasion later to suggest
th_at e:ven on doctrinal g!ounds the case against the constitutional status of environmental quality has been far
less than fully considered. Assume for the sake of argument that functional considerations actually do underlie
the views of everyone who is troubled by the notion of a
constitutional right to a clean environment. Acknowledge that in the reading of all but the most explicit of
constitutional provisions, and perhaps even then, doctrine is influenced by function. And concede, as I
readily do, that functional considerations emphatically
suggest that environmental quality is most prudentially
regarded as a political not a judicial question. Even my
former colleague Joseph Sax, perhaps the foremost advocate of an active judicial role in matters of environmental law, concluded in his book Defending the Environment that there should not be a constitutional right,
because a court "should not be authorized to function
as an environmental czar against the clear wishes of the
public and its elected representatives ."
But look at what Sax (and everybody else, apparently) has done: The idea of a constitutional right has
been coupled with the idea of judicial management of
the right. So far as I can tell, the entire debate on this issue -which seems to have ended with the appearance
of Professor Stewart's article a decade ago - has gone
forth on the singular notion that the Constitution and
the courts are necessarily coupled together. But that
notion, however typical, is hardly necessary, even as
a matter of doctrine.

The argument . . . commits what can
neatly be called the coupling fallacy.
Political question doctrine, for instance. Whatever
disputes there might be about its marginal meanings,
the central core of political question doctrine is conventional enough that I can simply quote an encyclopedia
on the subject. An entry labeled "Political Question" in
the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution says that the
Supreme Court recognized as early as the turn of the
last century "that decisions on some governmental

questions [and here the author, Philippa Strum, could
have added the words arising from constitutional provisions] lie entirely within the discretion of the 'political'
branches of the national government - the President
and Congress - and thus outside the proper scope of
judicial review." In other words, decisions on political
questions are not justiciable.
That is what Ms. Strum says at the beginning of her
essay. This is what she says at the end:
The [political question] device ... enables the judiciary to maintain its independence by withdrawing
from no-win situations .. . . The Supreme Court,
. declaring the presence of a political question, tacitly
admits that it cannot find and therefore cannot ratify
a social consensus .... The political question doctrine, which permits the Court to restrain itself from
precipitating impossible situations that might tear
the social fabric, gives the electorate and its representatives time to work out their own rules ....

This isn't perfect, but it's close enough, and anyone
wishing to read Ms. Strum's essay in its entirety will
find that the political question doctrine fits our case
quite nicely. Thus the Court has used the doctrine
when it would otherwise have to define obscure terms
(such as "republican form of government") the content
of which can be resolved only by picking one political
philosophy over another, or when it would have to develop principles beyond its capabilities, or when it
would have to announce unenforceable judgments.
All of this sounds strangely familiar. To my mind,
political question doctrine provides a ready answer
to the functional case against constitutional status for
environmental quality, because it lets us uncouple the
Constitution and the courts . That the judiciary is
incompetent to define and manage certain kinds of
constitutional conceptions is simply not a conclusive,
and maybe not even a very interesting, objection to the
conceptions themselves. The argument to the contrary
is faulty. It commits what can neatly be called the
coupling fallacy.
Is mine just a debater's point? What good is it to find
an item in the Constitution if the item is regarded by
the courts as raising nonjusticiable political questions?
And how would one get the item read into the Constitution in any event, aside from the difficult process of
constitutional amendment? Certainly the Court isn't
going to wend its tired way through the constitutional
text in search of something it already knows it will declare to be of a political, and hence nonjusticiable,
nature. And what about the doctrinal case against interpreting the Constitution in favor of environmental
quality? Commentators like Soper and Stewart claim
that function is not the sole concern; they claim that on
their reading of the constitutional te t (and on their
reading of the Supreme Court's reading of the constitutional text) the environment just isn't there. So even if
the functional objections are cancelled by the political
question doctrine, the doctrinal objections remain.
Two of these questions - the one about achieving the
desired reading, absent constitutional amendment; and
the one about the doctrinal arguments against the read-

ing - are related and call for separate treatment. The
question about the value of nonjusticiable constitutional language can be considered here. Taken all
together, my answers do not suggest that those who
debated the general issue in the years 1970 to 1977 were
wrong, on either side . The suggestion, rather, is that
much of what they had to say was irrelevant.

What good would constitutional
status be, without the courts?
So what good is a constitutional provision without
the courts directly behind it? There are a number of answers that come immediately to mind: Recognition of
the environment as an item with nonjusticiable constitutional status might, without contradicting the
purposes of political question doctrine, allow courts to
insist that the legislative and executive branches consider environmental values in an open and reasoned
way in the policy process, no matter what those
branches ultimately conclude. Similarly, recognition
might give courts room to construe ambiguous
legislation in favor of environmental values when the
competing values at stake in the legislation's meaning are not of constitutional dimension; or room to
manipulate the burden of proof in cases involving
the environment; and so on.
As interesting as these points might be, I do not wish
to pursue them here. All of them arise from the premise
that courts could still be indirectly behind our hypothetical constitutional provision. I want to consider
the value of the provision utterly independent of the
judiciary.
Assume, accordingly, that the courts are going to be
out of the picture entirely. What good would constitutional status be then? Obviously, I have to speculate.
My speculations would be greatly enriched if the ori~37

nal debaters had made my debater's point and thereby
been forced to take the question up, but none of that
happened. If it had, I imagine that someone would
have considered that a constitution is surely more than
a set of propositions about the structure and limits of
government and about concrete rights in the people.
A constitution - I'm convinced this is true of our
Constitution - must serve some more abstract purposes as well, whether you call them _symbolic or
educational or legitimating.
The Constitution itself, as a whole, is a symbol held
in immeasurable esteem by millions of people who
have never even read it. It follows that to be an item in
the Constitution, explicitly or not, is to take on a meaning larger than meanings that can be captured in, or
reduced to, mere operations. A republican form of government stands for something quite without the courts
and even if Congress itself cannot articulate, other than
by decisions in the name of the form, just what that
something is.
If I were a conscientious legislator or executive who
had taken my oath to heart, the fact that environmental
quality had constitutional status would make the environment mean something more to me than otherwise,
even if I could not articulate the meaning in the absence
of reaching decisions on particular issues. It would
make the environment mean more to me even if, but
more likely especially because, questions of environmental quality were regarded as nonjusticiable, so that
I and my colleagues had the last word on the questions.
My sense of the significance of having the environment
in the Constitution might be remote, but the consequences of the environment being there in the document could be immediate, as when some formerly loyal
group of my constituents asked me to make a close call
against environmental interests and I could point out
to them that, under the circumstances, I felt constitutionally bound to do otherwise.
Would my explanation to my constituents assure
their loyalty to me at the time of my re-election campaign? Hardly. But might the results of hundreds of reelection campaigns held over tens of years and involving hundreds of incumbents who acted as I be at least
marginally different, and in a direction favoring environmental quality, if environmental quality had
(nonjusticiable) constitutional status? I'm not sure, but
a bet on yes is a better bet than the bet that any one
particular legislator would be re-elected.
The argument from symbolism takes on more power
once one recognizes that all executives and all legislators and all constituents were once children, and that
most children actually study the Constitution, one way
or another, in school. Would students gather a different
set of notions about the environment if they studied it
as an item in the Constitution rather than as merely an
item in a science course or an elementary economics
course or a course in current events? Again, a bet that
over time the popular mind-set would change in a
statistically (and politically) significant way, and in a
direction more sympathetic to environmental values,
seems safe. For these sorts of reasons, I am unmoved
by the fact that in the few states that have amended
38

their constitutions to include the environment, policy
probably looks pretty much like it did before. It is far
too soon to tell. (And if policy does look pretty
much the way it did before, the amendments have
probably done no harm.)
It may be, however, that the best response to skeptics
is the response that accentuates the negative rather than
the positive. My colleague Frederick Schauer has drawn
from the literature and suggested to me the legitimating role of the Constitution. I don't mean, and Schauer
didn't mean, that constitutional recognition of the environment would give a special endorsement to environmental concerns. Probably it would, but merely as a
consequence of the symbolic and educational considerations discussed above. The legitimating role (perhaps it
would be better called the delegitimating role) is importantly different and has to do with a sort of negative
endorsement that might arise from the absence of an
item in the Constitution. The concern here is the appearance of implicit moral approval of something
actually wrong. Take state action doctrine, which says,
for instance, that the government shall not discriminate
on the basis of race. The unintended implication is that
private citizens may discriminate, that private discrimination is legitimate. The absence of the environment in
the Constitution could encourage similar, unintended
reasoning. You pollute. I object. You tell me not to make
a federal case out of it.
I am painfully aware that all of the foregoing sounds
soft and preachy, which is perhaps why it isn't often,
or ever, heard coming from legal scholars. I am equally
aware that a determined program of reading might,
to the contrary, actually uncover innumerable sources
where much the same was said or all the same rebutted
with the sort of rigor, and accompanied by the sort of
citations, one associates with solid professional work.
I would be willing to discipline my arguments and
do the reading if my agenda right now were more ambitious and less hopeless than simply getting those
debaters of ten years ago to concede that a lot of what
they argued about missed, if not the point, still quite
clearly a point, and that they would be well advised to
start anew.

Congress is the answer
Two related questions remain: Granting, purely for
the sake of argument, everything said thus far, and
putting a constitutional amendment to the side, and
recognizing that it would be strange for the Court to
search for something in the Constitution knowing all
along that any discovery would be regarded as a nonjusticiable matter, how could the environment ever find
constitutional status? How could it do so, in particular,
in the face of inhospitable constitutional doctrine?
The questions are related because Congress is the
answer to each of them. As Paul Brest and others have
pointed out at some length, it may usually be the case,
since Marbury v. Madison, that the Supreme Court is the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, but it is not ever
the case that it is the exclusive interpreter. It is in fact

perfectly plain that Congress is necessarily an interpreter as well, and that its interpretive authority can
be the equal of the Court's in that Congress may, on
occasion, step beyond the boundaries of the Court's
reading. Whether it is equal in the sense that Congress
is entitled to contradict the Court is a much more difficult matter, but one that can be ignored here because
the Court has never said, itself, explicitly, that the Constitution forecloses a reading that endorses
environmental values. So I do not see why Congress
could not enact a joint resolution or a statutory finding
expressing exactly such a reading- a reading whose
meaning, contours, and implications Congress would
be perfectly happy to have the Court regard as involving political questions, nonjusticiable issues.
Could a conscientious Congress declare such an
interpretation in the face of the doctrinal arguments
against it? Here I draw on an article by Judge Richard
Posner that appeared last year in The New Republic.
The article suggests, to me at least, that a conscientious
Congress could do precisely what I have in mind. In the
course of making a case against strict constructionism,
which is a brand of constitutional interpretation, Posner
observed that the choice of method of constitutional interpretation is a decision that itself entails, if you will,
constitutional interpretation, this simply because the
Constitution doesn't explicitly state how it, the Constitution, is to be interpreted. One can't say "The
Constitution says nothing on the matter of interpretation so it should be interpreted narrowly" and expect a
round of applause, because one could just as well say
"The Constitution says nothing on the matter of interpretation so it should be interpreted broadly." A choice
independent of explicit constitutional te t has to be
made. This doesn't mean, though, that the choice is independent of the Constitution as a text. Although Judge
Posner didn't say so exactly, I am sure he believes that
principled interpretation will have reference to the fabric of the document. Of particular bearing here, it will
have reference to, among other things, the constitutional role of the reader. So, regarding the choice of
interpretative approach, Posner wrote: "That decision
must be made as a matter of political theory, and will
depend on such things as one's view of the springs of
judicial legitimacy and of the relative competence of
courts and legislatures in dealing with particular types
of issues."
If, as seems to be the case, the legislature (along with
the executive) is the relatively competent branch in the
case of environmental matters, then it is difficult for me
to understand why it could not conscientiously interpret the Constitution - purely and e plicitly for its
own purposes, and purely in light of its own instrumental competence - in such a way as to recognize
the enduring importance of environmental quality. The
doctrinal arguments that might seem to stand in the
way may in fact be to the side, because they are arguments based on a reading of the Constitution for purely
judicial purposes. But our purposes are not judicial
at all.
Congress would not be expanding its legislative
authority by interpreting the Constitution in a manner

that recognizes environmental quality, because the
Commerce Clause already gives Congress broad power
to legislate in the area . Moreover, the interpretation I
have in mind need not be considered to create congressional obligations or limitations - not, at least,
justiciable ones. The interpretation would be simply
hortatory. (The environmental amendments to state
constitutions have been regarded by state courts in this
way.) For these reasons, I have shied away from couching my own argument in terms of a constitutional
right to environmental quality; I have spoken, rather,
of constitutional status.
I don't know whether it would be easy to convince
Congress to exercise its interpretive prerogative, and in
favor of environmental values. I am confident that the
chances that Congress could be so moved are better
than the chances of obtaining an amendment or of convincing the Court to take sympathetic action. I can't be
sure that granting constitutional status to environmental quality would matter in any event, but I addressed
above some reasons why it might. And, most of all, I
have little idea how to answer the long list of lawyers'
questions that would surely arise if Congress did exercise its prerogative. But those questions, whatever they
may be, I leave for now to people whose professional
concern is not the environment, but the Constitution.

Professor James E. Krier taught at UCLA and Stanford before
he joined the University of Michigan Law School faculty in
1983. His teaching and research interests lie chiefly in the
fields of property and environmental law.
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